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Abstract: This paper argues that rationality and belief are mutually formative 
dimensions  of  school  mathematics,  where  each  term  is  more  politically 
embedded than often depicted in the field of mathematics education research. 
School mathematics then presents not so much rational mathematical thought 
distorted  by  irrational  beliefs  but  rather  a  particular  mode  of  activity 
referenced to the performance of certain substitute skills and procedures that 
have come to represent mathematics in the school context as a result of social 
management.  The  paper  considers  alternative  modes  of  apprehending 
mathematical objects. Firstly, two accounts of how a young child might learn 
to  point  at  mathematical  entities  are  presented,  where  alternative 
interpretations  of  this  act  of  pointing  are  linked  to  conceptions  of 
enculturation.  This  comparison  then  underpins  a  discussion  of  how 
mathematics  is  produced  as  entities  to  be  acquired  according  to  certain 
ideological  schema.  The  resulting  cartographic  definition  of  mathematics 
steers  the  production  then  selection  of  learners  according  to  arbitrary 
curriculum or assessment criteria. Secondly, some trainee teachers report on 
shared experience in a spatial awareness exercise concerned with exploring 
alternative apprehensions of geometric objects. This provides an account of 
my own teaching and explains why I find teaching mathematics so exciting if 
it can be linked to the generation of multiple perspectives. The paper’s central 
argument is that rational mathematical thought necessarily rests on beliefs set 
within a play of ideological framings that within school often partition people 
in terms of their proxy interface with mathematics. The challenge is to loosen 
this administrative grip to allow both students and teachers to release their 
own powers to generate diversity in their mathematical insights rather than 
conformity.
Keywords: rationality, belief, ideology, learning mathematics
1
Rationality and belief in learning mathematics.
Tony Brown
Manchester Metropolitan University 
Abstract: This paper argues that rationality and belief are mutually formative 
dimensions  of  school  mathematics,  where  each  term  is  more  politically 
embedded than often depicted in the field of mathematics education research. 
School mathematics then presents not so much rational mathematical thought 
distorted  by  irrational  beliefs  but  rather  a  particular  mode  of  activity 
referenced to the performance of certain substitute skills and procedures that 
have come to represent mathematics in the school context as a result of social 
management.  The  paper  considers  alternative  modes  of  apprehending 
mathematical objects. Firstly, two accounts of how a young child might learn 
to  point  at  mathematical  entities  are  presented,  where  alternative 
interpretations  of  this  act  of  pointing  are  linked  to  conceptions  of 
enculturation.  This  comparison  then  underpins  a  discussion  of  how 
mathematics  is  produced  as  entities  to  be  acquired  according  to  certain 
ideological  schema.  The  resulting  cartographic  definition  of  mathematics 
steers  the  production  then  selection  of  learners  according  to  arbitrary 
curriculum or assessment criteria. Secondly, some trainee teachers report on 
shared experience in a spatial awareness exercise concerned with exploring 
alternative apprehensions of geometric objects. This provides an account of 
my own teaching and explains why I find teaching mathematics so exciting if 
it can be linked to the generation of multiple perspectives. The paper’s central 
argument is that rational mathematical thought necessarily rests on beliefs set 
within a play of ideological framings that within school often partition people 
in terms of their proxy interface with mathematics. The challenge is to loosen 
this administrative grip to allow both students and teachers to release their 
own powers to generate diversity in their mathematical insights rather than 
conformity.
Keywords: rationality, belief, ideology, learning mathematics
2
Introduction
The supposed wonder of mathematics is often lost in schools as a result of 
teachers  being  accountable  to  examination  regimes  that  have  been created 
ostensibly  in  support  of  the  mechanical  processes  that  govern  our  lives. 
Pedagogical mediations have a tendency to shape mathematical ideas so that 
they can be more readily seen, tested or applied. Even university mathematics 
comprises particular topographies anchored on selected objects or procedures 
prevalent  in certain places at  particular  points in time.  Meanwhile,  various 
styles  of  mathematical  thinking  have  been  created,  selected  or  funded  to 
support practical enterprises such as building bridges, the effective analysis of 
economic models, everyday finance, etc. The relevance of these enterprises, 
however, ebb and flow as time goes by, and so do the forms of mathematics 
that are produced in support. 
The realisation of this contingency troubles any account of mathematics 
existing out there waiting to be discovered or being seen through the objects 
that  have  already  been  noticed.  It  frustrates  any  attempts  to  pinpoint  the 
undeniable successes of mathematical  thought through its  visible  effects  in 
everyday practical activity. Yet it is commonly thought that there is something 
significant  in  mathematical  thought  itself  that  needs  to  be  accounted  for 
beyond  its  everyday  appearances  in  the  physical  world.  Seemingly,  such 
thought  has  properties  and  a  precision  that  produce  results  unlike  other 
symbolic  frameworks.  Our  practical  applications,  however,  cannot  fix  our 
mathematics thinking forever. Its empirical link to seemingly tangible objects 
ultimately slips away. 
This  paper  seeks  to  show  how  its  supposed  existence  beyond  its 
appearances  relies  on  a  play  of  ideological  perspectives  and  the  learner’s 
understanding of the demands that they face. The cut between those included 
in and those excluded from mathematical activity has nothing to do with any 
supposed intrinsic  qualities  of mathematics  but everything to  do with how 
mathematical ideas are packaged for human consumption. The paper argues 
for a more liberal attitude to the production of mathematical insights.
The  paper  begins  by  considering  the  production  of  mathematics  as  a 
cultural practice and the apparent social division of labour between those who 
do  more  advanced  mathematics  and  those  who  have  it  done  for  them.  It 
ponders  on  the  impossibilities  of  precisely  locating  mathematical  entities, 
caught  as  they  are  between  alternative  social  constructions.  The  second 
section focuses on the apprehension of mathematical  objects by examining 
how we  might  conceptualise  both  a  person  pointing  at  an  object  and  the 
apprehended  object  itself  amidst  diverse  contextual  parameters.  The  third 
section shows how the ideological space of schooling frames mathematical 
objects  to  suggest  a  field  of  mathematics  that  transcends  its  everyday 
manifestations. An example is then provided of student teachers encapsulating 
their  perceptions  during  a  spatial  awareness  exercise.  The  diversity  of 
responses reveals alternative subjective positions each highlighting different 
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qualities  of  the  apprehended  object.  The  paper  concludes  by  arguing  that 
mathematics is built into the human self-image clouding from view the earlier 
human construction of, or belief, in that mathematics. That is, the rationalities 
of  mathematics  are  always  being  re-constructed  anew  by  each  generation 
according  to  their  beliefs,  ideological  preferences,  or  specific  “societal 
mediation” (Roth, 2012), but where those attributes slip beneath one’s own 
self-consciousness and disturb its capacity to be complete. The paper argues 
for  a  loosening  of  administrative  arrangements  that  restrict  the  options 
available to learners of mathematics in schools.
The location of mathematics
This  section  discusses  how  one  acquires  mathematical  understanding  and 
where and when it comes into being. We often trust in a mathematics that 
appears to exceed us and perhaps everyone else. As a mathematically adept 
reviewer  of  this  paper  put  it:  “I  believe  the  four-colour  theorem has  been 
proved,  even  though I  have  neither  the  know-how,  inclination,  or  time  to 
verify  the  proof”.  Probably  all  people  prefer  to  let  others  know  or  do 
mathematics for them to some degree. Slavoj Žižek, however, who has been a 
major influence for this paper, provides a rather sceptical view of Stephen 
Hawking’s success in speaking for mathematics and physics to a wider public. 
Žižek (2001, p. 213) sees Hawking as a “new type of public intellectual … 
who,  in  the  eyes  of  the  wider  public,  stands  more  and  more  for  the  one 
‘supposed to  know’,  trusted  to  reveal  the  keys  to  the  great  secrets  which 
concern us all.”1 A division is created between those who know and those who 
feel they no longer need to as they defer to experts or machines.
Clearly,  no  single  person  could  know  the  full  extent  of  mathematical 
knowledge. Yet for many people in the wider population this trust in other 
people, or in technology, to do their mathematical thinking for them is rather 
more fulsome. Only half of British adults it seems can achieve the level of an 
average eleven year old and very often members of the other half expressed 
their emotional attachment to mathematics through pride in their deficiency 
(Paton,  2012). This  disinclination  to  participate  has  provoked  widespread 
curriculum reform targeted at ensuring that enough of the populace achieves 
some sort of basic functionality in the subject. These strategies sometimes fall 
short of providing the beauties of abstract thought and can shape mathematical 
thinking  according  to  a  consumerist  agenda  in  which  the  learning  of 
mathematics is seen primarily as the acquisition of knowledge specified in 
pre-defined ways. 
I concur with Pais (2015) who has argued that this polarisation of attitudes 
to mathematics is structural and endemic to the capitalist contextualisation of 
our  practice.  It  is  a  matter  to  be  lived  with  rather  than  resolved  through 
supposing that differences between people can be reduced. That is, the social 
1 Žižek’s  work  is  influenced  by  the  psychoanalytic  theory  of  Lacan.  This  sort  of 
“displacement of our most intimate feelings and attitudes onto some figure of the Other is at 
the very core of Lacan’s notion of the big Other; it can affect not only feelings but also beliefs 
and knowledge - the Other can also believe and know for me” (Žižek, 2006, pp. 26-27).
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structure shapes mathematical thinking according to current societal  norms, 
defining human identifications with mathematics according to the divisions of 
labour  endemic  to  the  structure.  For  example,  word  problems  are  never 
innocent.  They  typically  depict  a  Western  rectilinear  world  described 
according  specific  practices,  discursive  genres,  demographic  makeup  and 
economic priorities. This paper is essentially arguing that it is not possible to 
see mathematics outside of its apparent manifestation in such structures, but 
that school imposes further restrictions. The paper also presupposes that it is 
also impossible for each of us to see ourselves outside of those structures2. 
Our reality (e.g. capitalism) always already includes us as part of it.
Is then the mathematics that Hawking generates in his mind? Or is it in his 
gesturing finger movement that activates his computer? Or is the mathematics 
in the computer? Does mathematics rely for its existence on the computer’s 
output impacting on the interpretations of the community of mathematicians? 
Let’s try to unfold the backdrop to these questions. Perhaps in Hawking’s case 
mathematics  and  physics  live  through  their  dissemination  in  best-selling 
populist  texts.  In  part  the  existence  of  mathematics  is  underwritten  by its 
materialization in structures, processes and human action, as things that can be 
pointed  at.  For  example,  extensive  work  on  gesture  within  mathematics 
education research has considered how mathematical entities are materialised 
in  human  activity.  De  Freitas  and  Sinclair  (2012,  2014)  explored  the 
alternative  productivities  of  gestural  and  diagrammatic  evocations  of 
mathematical  ideas.  They  asked  how  the  qualitative  dimensions  of 
mathematics were a function of such materialisations. That is, is mathematics 
the same when it is pointed to in a gesture as when it is encapsulated in a 
diagram?  How  do  they  differentially  evoke  mathematical  objects  and  the 
(human) subjects creating them? We cannot readily draw a clear line between 
the human body and their operation of cultural machinery (Barad, 2007). As a 
learner of mathematics, my sense of where mathematics is located is never 
finally resolved. Is it part of me or not? Have I made it? Have I pointed to it? 
Or, to use my country’s colloquial educational parlance, has it been delivered 
to  me  as  if  it  is  a  product  brought  to  me  by  a  supermarket  van?  These 
concerns prevent any final resolution of the issue of location. Mathematical 
ideas necessarily comprise a play of perspectives.
What’s the point?
How then might mathematics relate to the “real” world? To what extent can 
mathematics  be  referenced  to  ostensible  objects?  How  is  it  possible  for 
someone  to  point  at  those  objects?  Let’s  take  an  example  arising  from a 
2 These  Symbolic (rational)  structures  that  shape our  ideological  space are 
within a knot of mutually dependency with our Imaginary (beliefs) of who we 
are, and the Real that defies all symbolisation. As Lacan (2000, p. 95) puts it: 
“The aggressive tension of this  either me or the other is entirely integrated 
into  every  kind  of  imaginary  functioning  in  man”.  Brown  (2011)  has 
explicitly discussed this play of perspectives in the context of mathematical 
learning.
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discussion between some delegates at the 2013 conference of  Mathematics  
Education  and Contemporary  Theory.  Julian  Williams  presented  a  critical 
analysis  of  a  book  by  Wolff-Michael  Roth  and  Luis  Radford  (Roth  & 
Radford, 2011). The specific concern related to how the teacher and student 
identify  and  share  a  mathematical  object.  Williams  (2015)  provided  two 
alternative  accounts  of  how  a  child  learns  to  point  at  an  object,  and  by 
implication two alternative accounts of how an object is brought into being. 
He attributes the first to Roth and Radford. He argues that the second is more 
in line with Vygotsky
Account One: An infant makes a random gesture 
an  infant  makes  a  random  gesture  that  seems  to  the  carer/parent  as 
though  the  infant  might  be  pointing,  the  carer/parent  interpret  it  as 
pointing,  and  consequently  reach  out  and  give  the  infant  the  object 
pointed  to,  and  thereby  ‘teach’  the  infant  to  point  at  desired  objects 
(Williams, 2015, online first).  
Williams cites Roth et al (2011, p. 69) on this point:
A movement receives the sense of an action of a particular kind first by 
the  culturally  competent  individual  before  this  sense  comes  to  be 
actualised by the child. In the example Vygotsky provides, there first is a 
random movement. The child does not know its cultural signification; it 
does not (yet) know to point. Rather the parent who sees the child move 
understands it as a pointing gesture. 
Account Two: The infant has a clear purpose in reaching out 
the infant initiates the joint activity by having a clear purpose in reaching 
out to grasp some desired object, such as a dummy or shiny toy. It is this 
desire which is interpreted by a culturally competent  carer/helper,  one 
who empathises with the infant’s frustration, and who is thus motivated 
to  help  the  infant  relieve  their  frustration  by  progressing  the  action 
towards fulfilling its goal. The infant has then to notice the carer’s action, 
recognise its association with their grasping movement, and practice this 
on a number of occasions. The practised infant looks at a desired object, 
reaches  out,  ‘points’,  and  looks  to  the  carer  for  their  reaction.  The 
evolution of ‘reaching out to grasp’ into ‘pointing to indicate’ as a means 
to grasp/act on an object-motive and achieve a desired outcome involves 
an  internalisation  of  pointing  as  a  communicative  act,  whereupon the 
child has ‘learnt to point’ (Williams, 2015, online first).
In  both  accounts,  the  pointing  relation  involves  an  algebraic  connection 
between a signifier and a signified. This hand position is associated with that  
object. I recall a seminar led by Caleb Gattegno where he made this point in 
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mentioning the example of a baby pointing to a fly moving on the ceiling. But 
which came first, the pointing hand or the object? In the case of a shiny toy, a 
dummy  or  a  fly  the  hand  points  at  a  pre-existing  entity.  An  alternative 
however is for the pointing hand itself to bring the object into existence. The 
discussion gets more complicated if attention turns to how the teacher and 
student might point at an algebraic relationship  as an algebraic relationship. 
There  are  many  ways  of  understanding  teachers  and  students,  and  the 
subjective positions that could be assumed by them. There are also many ways 
of  understanding  algebraic  relationships.  That  is,  the  symbolic  objects  of 
algebra can be framed (or cut) in different ways according to the subjective 
position being assumed in relation to them. In the teaching relationship that 
Roth  and  Radford  are  depicting  the  teacher  is  pointing  at  an  algebraic 
relationship  as a teacher, where the “object-motive” is for the student to  see 
this algebraic relationship. 
There are however some issues that prevent us from framing or evaluating 
this encounter in a definitive way. Williams raises the question as to whether 
the student is required to see the object in the same way as the teacher, or if 
the object is transformed through the pedagogical encounter. Williams favours 
the  latter,  and  further,  where  the  object-motive  is  encapsulated  within  a 
particular curriculum structure that fixes pedagogical relationships according 
to some particular ideology of education. For instance, the current obsession 
with  international  comparisons  shapes  curriculums  so  that  algebraic 
relationships are framed according to how they would be tested within that 
regime.  That  is,  the  ideological  productivity  of  the  pedagogical  encounter 
affects the object in question by situating it within a context or frame that 
favours some interests rather than others.
A more radical alternative might question the wider framing that promotes 
and  situates  algebraic  relationships  as  having  a  pivotal  role.  As  Williams 
suggests, Roth and Radford’s discussion is centred on the apparent expression 
of emotion by some very specific sorts of students in a laboratory classroom 
governed  by  a  school  structure  that  shapes  the  teachers,  students  and 
mathematics within it. There are other ways of doing it. Local administrations 
variously  shape  mathematical  instruction  to  facilitate  learning  in  particular 
settings  where  maybe:  children  are  taught  differently  according  to  their 
ability,  customary choices  prevail  (class  size,  resource allocation,  styles  of 
teaching),  mathematical teaching is differentiated according to social group, 
the resistance of adolescents to adult guidance results in teaching styles being 
shaped by the needs of classroom management, etc. More generally, teacher 
capabilities are dependent on a broad range of factors. For example, generalist 
teachers at primary level may be insecure or unknowledgeable about algebraic 
relationships.  This  could  affect  how  students  encounter  algebraic 
relationships,  perhaps  through  didactic  approaches  with  reduced  scope  for 
exploration,  or  through  a  published teaching  scheme  in  which  the  teacher 
herself has a rather marginal pedagogical role. More widely, setting policy to 
bring  about  widespread  adjustment  to  teacher  practices  towards  raising 
“standards”,  or national  test  scores,  is  a  persistent aspiration.  Yet advisory 
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groups, regulators, trainers, research funding agencies and potential employers 
work according to a variety of perspectives and priorities in terms of what a 
curriculum  is  intended  to  achieve.  This  variety  of  interest  results  in 
disjunctions between specifications of policy, implementation by teachers and 
the conceptualisations made of such implementations  by researchers across 
many  diverse  studies.  In  short,  the  constitutions  of  teachers,  students  and 
mathematics are contingent on many factors. The act of pointing at an object 
can  never  be  understood in  a  straightforward  manner  as  both  pointer and 
pointed at defy sustainable encapsulations.
Curriculum as acquisition
School mathematics is understood through curriculum formulations, teaching 
schemes and textbooks that challenge children and teachers to follow or create 
mathematical procedures. These formulations are shaped around objects that 
could be pointed at and become more or less familiar objects through repeated 
use  (e.g.  circles,  fractions,  Pythagoras  formula)  or  procedures  (e.g.  long 
multiplication,  factorising).  Particular  styles  of  questioning  are  favoured, 
especially  those  that  more  readily  lead  to  clearer  assessment  and  specific 
modes of interpreting  pedagogical  encounters.  These familiar  mathematical 
forms have become the institutionalised markers of much school mathematics 
that promote conformity (Brown & McNamara, 2011; Brown & Clarke, 2013; 
Williams,  2013).  For  example,  multiplication  tables  often  provide  a  key 
reference  point  in  school  mathematical  learning  and  become  part  of  the 
caricature of mathematics with which pupils identify. That is, they develop a 
view of “multiplication tables” as being a key part of mathematics, and begin 
to understand themselves as being mathematical through indicators, such as 
their proficiency in learning their tables.
The literature in mathematics education research has widely reported on 
the  caricatures  or  beliefs,  which  orient  the  pupils’,  or  teachers’,  broader 
mathematical  understanding,  shape  their  experience  of  the  “pedagogical 
encounters” that bring them together, and, less often, of the notional “macro 
political  context”  that  shapes  their  actions.  Fishbein (1987,  p.  206)  argued 
“there is a world of stabilized expectations and beliefs which deeply influence 
the reception  and the use of mathematical  and scientific  knowledge”.  Yet, 
Leder,  Pehkonen and  Torner (2002, p. 1) saw this dimension as a “hidden̈  
variable in mathematics education”. Goldin, Roesken and Torner̈  (2009) have 
reviewed  the  large  volume  of  later  work  that  has  addressed  this  apparent 
deficit. Skott  (2014, p.  3) has more  recently suggested that  research could 
usefully “shift the focus from beliefs to the pre-reified processes that are said 
to  give  rise  to  them”.  For  instance,  our  beliefs  with  regard  to  school 
mathematics  relate  to  rationalities,  cartographies  and  codes  of  conduct 
produced through earlier beliefs. More broadly, the addition of elements to the 
school curriculum (e.g. tables and graphs) and the reduction of other areas 
(e.g. geometry) mark the on-going historical formation of mathematical ideas 
in the context of social practices. Systems of rationality evolve with beliefs: 
“what others have learned has to be re-learned, re-integrated and re-expressed 
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in each generation” (Mason, 1994, p. 177); “the being of what we are is first 
of all an inheritance, whether we know it or like it or not” (Derrida, 1994, p. 
54). Ernest (2015) discusses this matter in detail through historically changing 
understandings of certainty in mathematics.
For  example,  school  mathematical  themes  could  be  seen  as  being 
constituted through  counting as one a certain set of objects (tables, graphs, 
etc.) (Brown, 2011). But similarly,  the points on the curve produced by the 
equation y=x2 +3 get counted as one and get to be called a “quadratic” so that 
the  term  “quadratic”  becomes  a  particular  enshrined  object  within  the 
landscape in question that  anchors or guides how we make sense (Brown, 
Heywood, Solomon & Zagorianakos, 2012).  Yet the statements that seek to 
locate and define mathematical phenomena so often become the statements 
that police its boundaries and set its policies on inclusion and selection. Pupils 
must know their tables and recognise a quadratic if they are to advance in their 
mathematical  studies  in  school,  as  it  is  understood  within  the  particular 
regime. 
Further, mathematics, as it is taught in many schools, is often referenced 
to the  sort  a  university academic  mathematician  would  suppose  to  be 
mathematical content. This may provide the frame of reference against which 
the correctness of mathematics carried out by children in schools is judged. 
The mathematics encountered in schools is also locally defined around social 
practices,  such  as  calculating  supermarket  bills,  estimating  the  number  of 
bricks  needed  for  a  wall,  predicting  demographic  trends  etc.  The  point, 
however, is not to target the supposed underlying mathematics as the ultimate 
quest but rather to 1) question why mathematical activities in the classroom 
have  assumed  the  social  forms  that  they  have,  and  2)  to  explore  the 
consequences  of those outcomes.  The English mathematics  curriculum has 
partitioned mathematical ideas and themes for consumption in schools. The 
British government  has exercised its  control  over teachers  and students  by 
specifying  specific  skills  and  competencies,  which  stand  in  for  the 
government’s  supposed  obligation  to  promote  a  numerate  population  with 
consequent benefits to our society, technology, and the economy. Maybe even 
those marks are not being hit and we could pursue alternatives.
Mathematical  activity  is  commonly  understood  as  being  targeted  at 
evoking particular mathematical concepts. Alternatively, however, the activity 
could  be  understood  as  a  microcosm  of  social  activity  more  generally. 
Mathematical activities governed by certain procedures, rules, performance-
criteria, etc. might be referenced to other social discourses, including others 
specifically related to mathematical heritage. Seen in this way mathematical 
objects become a function of their relationship with multiple discourses. This 
softens any assumption that the activities are necessarily anchored in specific 
mathematical  concepts.  Rather,  the  reification  of  the  supposed concepts  is 
unfolded across multiple sites. Here there would be no universal conceptions 
of what mathematics should be about; rather our conceptions would be linked 
to the historical and social processes that generated classroom mathematics in 
the material forms it now takes. As suggested, the advance of mathematical 
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thinking is defined by the production of objects, often in response to newly 
defined applications, funding priorities and pedagogical circumstances, or as a 
result of ever more pervasive formal assessment demands in schools. 
Such trends are consequential to school mathematics being pulled in two 
directions at the same time. School mathematics serves mathematical heritage, 
and often mathematics  education  research  understands  its  task in  terms  of 
serving that ambition.  This orientation however obscures the demands of a 
more insistent master to be found in the political and economic structures that 
shape so many of our everyday actions, and in particular our encounters with 
what  mathematics  has  become  in  Anglophone  contexts  at  least  (Brown, 
Hodson & Smith, 2013). The pursuit of economic ambitions sometimes seems 
to  result  in  school  mathematics  favouring  the  performance  of  skills  and 
procedures  rather  than  nurturing  the  student’s  more  intuitive  powers  of 
mathematical rationality. Contemporary politics, however, is complicated by 
the  disjunction  of  governmental  politics  and  the  operation  of  the  market, 
which  forces  the  hand of  state  to  adopt  certain  forms  of  economic  policy 
(Bauman, 2014). That is, real power is no longer with governments setting 
policies,  and  the  explicitly  stated  regulative  apparatus  that  shapes  school 
practice  reveals  that  governments  are  merely  acting  in  the  service  of 
oligarchic powers that transcend them, and over which they have little control 
in  terms  of  delivering  an  equitable  distribution  of  economic,  cultural  and 
educational capital (Piketty, 2014). Pais (2015, online first) takes the example 
of  how  motivation  is  activated  between  the  two  contrary  demands  and 
transcends  much  work  on  beliefs  in  mathematics  education  research  by 
insisting  on an  over-arching  political  dimension  in  linking mathematics  to 
beliefs about what it is:
(To)  believe  that  mathematics  as  an  object  has  already  in  itself  the 
properties that will trigger students’ desire for learning is to neglect all 
the students for whom engagement in mathematics does not derive from 
a “will to learn” but from a will to satisfy some Other’s demand (say, 
parents’  demand  for  good  grades,  teachers’  demand  for  learning, 
academic or professional demands, etc.). It is an aspiration as pious as it 
is  naive  to  assume  that  students  will  engage  in  mathematics  for  the 
satisfaction of exploring mathematics. To use the Lacanian lexicon, it is 
the  cause  and  not  the  object  of  desire  that  determines  students’ 
engagement in mathematics. This cause has to be located not in intrinsic 
characteristics  of  mathematics  nor  in  the  innermost  core  of  student’s 
being, but in politics. 
The mathematics that we encounter in schools has been shaped according to 
ideological schema to produce its pedagogical forms, schematic applications 
and the type of students it wants to include or exclude, or can afford to fund or 
not.  The  assessment  of  school  mathematics,  for  instance,  is  linked  to  the 
regulation of citizens as part of what Althusser sees as the wider ideological  
state  apparatus  “through  which  the  symbolic  machine  of  ideology  is 
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‘internalised’” (Žižek, 1989, p. 43). Ideology speaks through us by processing 
what  we say according  to  its  preferred  mode  of  shaping the  world.  It  “is 
language that uses us” (Lacan, 2007, p. 66). But for Lacan the representations, 
or  actuality,  of  school  mathematics  evoke  rather  than  fully  capture  more 
embedded  or  historical  mathematical  understandings.  That  mathematics  is 
supposed to be slightly beyond reach gives it a mystery and allure. For the 
advanced mathematician the attraction may be the supposed abstraction that 
transcends the mere symbols. For the less enthusiastic student it may be cool 
not to be a geek. The name “mathematics” is a “pure signifier that designates, 
and at the same time constitutes its identity” and “locates something that is 
beyond the variable cluster of its descriptive properties” (Žižek, 1989, p. 98) 
thwarting a consistent ideal account of what mathematics “is”. Peeling away 
all of the layers leaves us with nothing. There “is no ‘world’ outside language, 
no world whose horizon of meaning is not determined by a symbolic order” 
(Žižek, 2012, p. 366). As Lacan (2007, p. 124) puts it: “language ... cannot be 
anything  other  than  a  demand,  a  demand  that  fails”.  Mathematics  is  only 
produced through activities taking place in its name, but this name has been 
linked to particular political preferences that do not reveal their true purpose.
The point of my own teaching
So what are we pointing at when we are pointing at mathematical entities, a 
layer  of  an  onion,  an  inner  kernel?  The  paper  proposes  to  argue  that 
mathematical entities comprise the very play of perspectives on them. Here I 
will describe some work that I have done with some students where I have 
explored  these  issues  from my perspective  as  a  teacher.  I  have  a  regular 
weekly class with a group of adults, typically in their twenties and thirties, 
from a range of professions, retraining to be mathematics teachers in British 
secondary  schools.  As  non-mathematics  specialists  they  are  offered  the 
opportunity to develop their pedagogical understanding of mathematics over a 
period  of  six-nine  months  prior  to  entering  the  year  long,  school-based 
postgraduate  “training”  course  now  typical  in  England  and  Wales.  My 
ambition  as  their  teacher  is  to  introduce  them  to  a  broad  range  of 
mathematical  experiences  over  twenty  three-hour  sessions  prior  to  the 
intensity of the subsequent training year where a relatively reductive version 
of school mathematics will be encountered. Brown, Rowley and Smith (2015) 
have discussed how this model of training compresses both teacher subject 
knowledge and the teacher’s understanding of her own professional challenge.
In some activities directed towards enabling the students to develop their 
spatial awareness as a prelude to a more formalised approach to geometry they 
were invited to explore various body movement activities. My intention here 
was to explore geometric entities from multiple perspectives, especially from 
inside very large versions of these configurations. For example, a student was 
asked to position herself between two dots on the ground that were about four 
metres apart, but where she was twice as far from one dot as she was from the 
other. She was asked to walk so that she was always twice as far from one dot 
as  she  was  from  the  other.  Alternative  interpretations  were  provided  as 
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various students attempted this challenge. My hope was that there would be a 
lot of variety in the responses so that alternative ways of making sense of the 
situation could be shared and compared later. A number of students produced 
drawings linking the points that satisfied the conditions,  showing that they 
made a circular path (Figure 1):
 
Figure 1. Constructions of circles
Another student reported a completely different experience in connection with 
the same problem. His response was to produce the following set of equations, 
seeing the same circular loci but in algebraic terms:
 
(x – 12)2 + (y – 0)2 = 62
 
x2 -24x + 144 + y2 = 36
 
x2 -24x + 108 + y2 = 0
 
I checked that the formula is correct by solving when y = 0.
 
x2 - 24x + 108 = 0, x = 6 or 18
 
The issues became yet more complicated as the problem shifted to remaining 
twice as far from one dot as from the other in three-dimensional space. The 
challenge  provoked  much  ostensive  gesturing  alluding  to  points  beyond 
immediate grasp and constructions out of string to confirm speculations (see 
Figure 2).
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Figure 2. “Conceptualising” a 3-dimensional object using string.
This experience was written up at home as part of a diary package that would 
eventually be submitted for the course assessment. The course is set up at the 
outset  as  a  place  where  we  all  research  how  people  learn  mathematics. 
Starting with ourselves and our own learning we tell stories of our experiences 
towards building some sensitivity to understanding how similar situations can 
be  experienced  in  very  different  ways  and  that  our  own  learning  can  be 
enhanced  by trying  to  see  my problem through  someone  else’s  eyes.  We 
explore our respective beliefs and expound the rationalities that link them. For 
example, two students in the same subgroup experiencing the same discussion 
documented the different ways in which they saw their colleagues had made 
sense of the problem:
people  do  not  visualise  the  same  problem  in  the  same  way  ...  each 
individual  gave  very  different,  but  equally  valid,  explanations  ...  for 
seeing a circle in 3D ...: a penny being spun around at the end of a piece 
of  string;  modelling  the  shape  with  your  hands;  imagining  being  the 
origin of the circle (therefore being inside the shape) and what it would 
look like looking in each direction; imagining the shape being built up 
from the established points which were on the ground. 
This student produced a drawing to show her own image (See Figure 3).
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Figure 3. A sphere
What was interesting was the different ways in which we described our 
thoughts  and  showed  them  to  the  group.  N  was  thinking  and 
demonstrating  as  if  she  was  inside  the  shape.  S  looked like  she  was 
thinking outside the shape. I thought of the shape spinning on a fixed 
axis, this fixed axis being along the line of the 2 fixed points I was also 
visualising the shape on a 3D type computer programme. J thought of it 
spinning  on a  fixed  axis  and used  the  idea  of  spinning  of  a  coin  to 
explain. We all agreed that the shape made would be a sphere.
This second student continues:
Even though we all had different conceptualisations of what the curve 
looked like in 3D we could agree that we were talking about the same 
curve.  This  happened  because  each  individual  explained  their 
visualisation  and  it  fitted  in  with  each  of  the  other  individuals 
conceptualisation. For example, I imagined looking at the shape from the 
side seeing the established points and building it up from there. However 
I  could  see  that  the  image  of  a  penny  being  spun  fitted  with  my 
visualisation so could assume that person was having an equivalent (and 
yet different) visualisation to me. 
So a sphere is a sphere but different people can experience it in different ways 
at different times (as a set of equations, drawing, as an imagined ostensible 
object,  like  this  ball).  “Every  interpretation  is  partial,  ‘embedded’  in  an 
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interpreter’s ultimately contingent subjective position” (Žižek, 2012, p. 359). 
Qualitative or perspectival dimensions supplement the mere fact of a sphere. 
Observing and making sense of the experience of others can further develop 
the qualitative or subjective experience of the sphere. For some there was a 
revelation in realising that the sphere could be understood or approached in 
many different ways, and that the equivalence of these alternative approaches 
might be demonstrated. As their teacher I opened many opportunities for ideas 
to be negotiated or exchanged. The students typically worked in small groups 
but regularly came together for whole class discussions. Every half an hour I 
typically  stopped  the  group  so  that  they  could  engage  in  five  minutes  of 
private reflective writing to capture as “live data” how their understandings 
were  developing.  On  some  occasions  students  were  invited  to  read  their 
comments aloud with view to revealing the diversity of response. For their 
“homework” after the session students were urged to build a commentary of 
the lesson out of these pieces of reflective writing combined with their written 
mathematical  work.  The  story  of  “how  the  learning  took  place”  for  the 
individual and for the different subgroups was emphasised as a major lesson 
objective.  That  is,  the  pedagogical  story  was  valued  as  well  as  the 
mathematical  story  in  the  steep  learning  curve  entailed  in  the  student’s 
journey from seeing mathematics primarily as subject knowledge, to seeing it 
as  pedagogical  content  knowledge,  or  as  mathematics  conceived  from the 
point of view of a learner. In a separate study I worked with a colleague in 
enabling graduate student teachers of English to document their own personal 
changes in relation to their subject area over a year as a key dimension of their 
course assessment (Hanley & Brown, in press).
On  the  occasion  described  another  student  reported  a  more  affective 
experience of being within the activity:
On  reflection,  at  that  moment,  I  felt  a  real  mix  of  emotions  which 
combined many of the emotions that pupils face when asked to speak in 
class, in situations where they are not completely sure of what they are 
talking about. These involved almost a fear of saying the wrong thing, a 
desire to achieve the right answer, a wish not to appear foolish in front of 
the “teacher” and peers and also a concern over whether my explanation 
will be understood or even make sense. 
This  extract  suggests  that  her  mathematical  experience  was  imbued  with 
social,  emotional  and historical  baggage.  The imagination  of  the  object  in 
question, however, has real effect on the person’s image of his or her self in 
attempting to make tangible  the object that  is being sought.  The person is 
reflexively  constituted  through their  attempt  to  grasp it.  The  grasp reveals 
aspects of who they are. Thus the activity as a whole was centred on each 
student  exploring  alternative  subjective  positions,  on  documenting 
connections to alternative formations of self: such as, a physical self moving 
in space, a pedagogical self reflecting on the learning of others, a geometric 
self creating drawings, an algebraic self solving formulae, an emotional self 
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commenting  on how it  felt  relating  to  other  students  in the context  of the 
supposed mathematical entities. But in building these images of oneself one is 
alerted  to  territory that  one can grasp in  a tangible  way and seemingly to 
spaces  beyond  reach that  can  only be pointed  to  or  speculated.  There  are 
questions as to from where things are being seen. What am I seeing? Who, 
when or where am I precisely to be seeing it in that way? What had been 
movements of the body became elements of one’s comprehension of reality 
itself. The experience of the configurations became linked to how one felt at 
the time, a narrative of participation formalised for posterity, seemingly held 
in  place  by both  rationality  and belief  at  “the  moment  of  pure  subjective 
decision or choice which stabilizes a world” (Žižek, 2012, p. 367). 
Each time these sessions are new for me in my role as the teacher as each 
individual account has unique features and a particular story telling style. This 
year  the  sessions  have  been  enlivened  by  a  move  to  a  large  brand  new 
building  that  allows  new spatial  experiences  –  a  huge  internal  atrium for 
suspending/stretching string in 3D, a drama studio that allows spotlighting, 
expansive flat  space outside (where cold weather  tempered the pleasure of 
making the curves very large), etc.  My persistent ambition, the point of my 
teaching spelt out for my students, is for me to see things in new ways, to 
keep my teaching alive by enabling my students to provide new stimulus to 
each other  and to  me,  to  resist  final  versions that  sum things  up,  towards 
recognising  and  perhaps  specifying  the  limits  of  one’s  certainties  and 
uncertainties.
Rationality and belief
We process reality by referencing our experiences to our preferred ways of 
telling our stories. Žižek’s favourite example is the cinema since it provides us 
with  the  story  forms  against  which  we  can  gauge  the  pleasures  and 
disappointments of our own everyday lives. We could as easily see schooling 
as a similar arena in which we make sense of who we are. The rationality of 
school mathematics might be seen as being contingent on how we prioritise 
and order the ostensible objects that we believe to be a part of it within the 
school setting. We recognise ourselves in the stories we tell, but not quite, and 
our attempts to get a better fit motivates our participation. Any apprehension 
of reality requires a subjectively located view to structure what we see. We 
need to ask where are we coming from in seeing things in the way that we do. 
And ultimately, our assumptions as to where we are coming from become part 
of reality. 
The retroactive twists we make on our narratives of participation, and our 
attempts  to  stabilise  them  in  some  way  for  posterity,  comprise  the  very 
production of reality.  The lived experience of a sphere is condensed into a 
form of words, a set of symbols, some drawings, or the articulation of a mixed 
set  of  emotions.  The  mimetic  act  of  making  sense  through  experience 
produces reality in the always already failed attempt to stabilize the world to 
scrutinise it. The  attempted conflation of time produces a parallactic play of 
perspectives, a compression of points of view, which necessarily exceed my 
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sense of self achieved in any singular perspective. 
So then, are we pointing at mathematical objects in which we believe as a 
consequence of our empirical experience or do we know that they are there as 
a result of rationally thinking them into being consequential to making sense 
of  that  experience?  The  controversial  British  scientist  Richard  Dawkins 
(2006)  has  provoked  much  public  debate  as  a  result  of  seeing  scientific 
rationality  and religious  belief  as being in opposing camps:  “I  am against  
religion  because  it  teaches  us  to  be  satisfied  with  not  understanding  the  
world”3.  Yet  reason  and  belief  are  not  simply  opposed  to  each  other.  A 
hermeneutic circularity is implied where beliefs produce rationality and vice 
versa.  More radically,  from a Hegelian  perspective,  “the object  is  always-
already bound up in the complex mediating process of the subject’s thinking 
it, and conversely, the subject’s thinking the object is itself bound up in the 
object’s very existence” (Davis, p. 14). “What we experience as reality is not 
the thing itself, it is always-already symbolised, constituted, structured by way 
of symbolic mechanisms”  (Žižek, 2011, p. 240). 
Sverker Lundin brought my own production of reality to my attention after 
reading an earlier draft of this paper. Sverker asked whether I, Tony Brown, 
as I understand myself, ultimately believed that there is a field of mathematics 
beyond  all  of  the  ideological  distortions.  Such  a  belief  appeared  to  be 
materialised in my mode of expression, perhaps through an over-casual use of 
words by force of habit, as if I had left some part of mathematics undisturbed 
by  the  ideological  analysis,  and  then  discussed  distortions,  desires, 
relationships,  positions,  etc.  If  this  were to  be the case,  Lundin suggested, 
mathematical objects would be analysed:
as nothing more than reifications of discursive practice – as the result of 
“counting  as  one”  a  range  of  practices,  the  result  of  geographical 
invariance and chronological stability, the result of learning to relate to 
them as objects, etc.
Yes, I am guilty as charged as I still am quite unable to exorcise past versions 
of self, which have made me the fully consistent academic who I am now. 
A Lacanian account of the human subject has no aspiration to settle down 
with a final correct version. 
Lundin  convincingly prefers to assert an alternative view that allows for 
temporal adjustment and qualitative shifts of perspective, which requires one:
to analyse the  seeming impossibility of this first step as an ideological 
effect – that is:  to understand the seeming obviousness of there being 
something “more” in mathematics, beyond politics, economy, schooling, 
as the sublime of mathematics, as something that is already part of step 
one,  as  a  necessary  part  of  the  constitution  of  the  objectivity  of 
mathematics as such.
3 Source Google. Dawkins was the University of Oxford's Professor for Public 
Understanding of Science from 1995 until 2008 (Wikipedia).
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Here we do not  have a  mathematical  backdrop that  gets  distorted through 
subsequent  usage. This  unity never  existed  in  the  first  place.  It  “is  just  a 
retroactive  illusion”  (Žižek,  2014,  pp.  49-50).  Further:  “nothing  has  been 
abstracted  from any reality.  On the contrary it’s  already inscribed in  what 
functions as this reality” (p. 14). The reality of the pointing hand described in 
our first example is embraced by a symbolic universe, which is disturbed by 
its  inclusion,  whether  it  is  seen  as  a  “random gesture”  or  it  has  a  “clear 
purpose”.
Mathematical thought derives from realities that are consequential to past 
human endeavours or conceptualizations. Many mathematical objects have an 
empirically motivated dimension; circles are motivated by naturally occurring 
phenomena,  iterative  processes  model  humans  experience  of  progressively 
getting  closer,  statistics  organises  clusters  of  human  information,  etc.  But 
often  this  empirical  motivation  underlying  mathematical  forms  is  lost  in 
history, and we may not fully appreciate the implications of earlier empirical 
motivation for structuring our thoughts in particular ways and how they now 
influence our preferred or familiar ways of making sense. We also lose track 
of how past ideological/subjective perspectives are built into current ways of 
looking. For example, the concept of sphere may influence the way in which 
we  mark  out  space.  Indeed,  is  direct  apprehension  possible  without 
historically derived markers (that bring with them their own past ideological 
priorities or contingent intuitive sense of how things work)? Or might we need 
to  loosen  our  reliance  on  past  structures  (e.g.  Newtonian  physics)  and 
experience  space through alternative  constructions  (e.g.  relativity  in  space, 
sub-aqua spatial dynamics, quantum physics). 
We reflect  the  symbolic  universe,  and  it  reflects  us.  Both  Darwin  and 
Einstein were great individual figures but the novelist Ian McEwan (2013) in 
his Guardian article  “The originality of the species” argued that  they were 
each standing in evolving symbolic universes at particular moments in time 
that would deliver the results to someone or other in due course4. Ultimately, 
like  Hawking  or  Dawkins,  they  have  become  iconic  figures  providing 
symbolic points of reference and particular inflections that seek to stabilise 
ever-shifting discursive arrangements. They successfully “cut” reality into a 
particular  time-dependent  configuration  that  allowed  a  particular  kind  of 
subjective hold, or brought a particular form of “master-ized” discourse into 
play (Lacan, 2007, p. 103), that is, a style of discourse picked up by others 
that shapes the character of the field, and privileges some points of view over 
others. 
School mathematics and other types of mathematical activity are built  in 
the human’s own self image as they reflect the human challenges for which 
4 Darwin  was  ultimately  fitter  than  Alfred  Wallace  who  simultaneously 
reached the same conclusions independently, and so it was Darwin who was 
naturally  selected and  survived!  See:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-
21549079.  Due  respect  goes  to  the  referee  who  was  unconvinced  by  this 
example.
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they are created. Humans, however, are also a product of the worlds that they 
have produced, where a division of labour has arisen to reflect and serve the 
prevailing  social  administration.  The  mathematical  entities  that  they  have 
constructed  are  then  built  into the  human  self-image  as  they  reference 
themselves  to  the  world  that  they  have  created.  A  child  may  understand 
herself in terms of her shoe size, the number of dolls she has, her age or her 
maths  scores.  A  teacher  may  understand  himself  in  terms  of  his  key 
performance indicators, tax rate, postcode or Prozac dosage. These parallactic 
self-producing and self-validating rationalities trap us into believing that there 
are universal realities (or rationalities) as to what it is to be mathematical and 
as to what it is to be human. What had been understandings of ourselves have 
become  policing  structures.  Mathematical  thought  presented  as  a  set  of 
potential  acquisitions  has  created  the  belief that  there  is  something  more 
tangible that assumes the quality of reality.  Rationalities are then produced 
that are particular to those contingent arrangements or understandings of the 
world. The material points of reference that characterise school mathematics 
then support both a belief in mathematical entities referenced to contemporary 
societal  structures and a contingent rationality that connects them. Rational 
mathematical  thought  necessarily  rests  on  beliefs  set  within  a  play  of 
ideological framings that sort people into types by limiting mathematical and 
pedagogical options. School mathematics then, built in a contemporary human 
self-image,  presents  not  so  much  a  distortion  of  “genuine”  mathematical 
thought as a particular mode of thinking that serves to produce then select 
learners according to arbitrary curriculum and assessment criteria. 
In  brief,  mathematical  productivity  results  from  a  play  of  ideological 
perspectives,  where  arbitrary  perspectives  are  selected  to  facilitate  social 
administration, but in so doing reduce mathematics by restricting the sorts of 
more personal insights that can be acknowledged in a school setting. I have 
sought to show through my own teaching how mathematical challenges might 
be seen more in terms of students being supported in developing accounts of 
and gaining confidence in their own perspectives rather than meeting preset 
objectives.  The challenge to the reader that this paper advocates is to loosen 
this administrative grip through his or her own preferred point of leverage 
(ballot  box,  adjusting  teaching  style,  influencing  curriculum  decisions, 
political  resistance,  writing  a  paper  for  ESM,  etc)  to  allow individuals  to 
release  their  own  powers  to  generate  diversity  in  their  mathematical 
understandings rather than conformity.
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